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PATENTS-PROCEDURE-APPLICABILITY OF Il\'VENTION SECRECY ACT 
WHERE GOVERNMENT UsE OF INVENTION Is AUTHORIZED-After extended 
negotiations, plaintiff entered into a contract with the United States for the 
development of a new model "hemisphere sight," a mock-up of which plain-
tiff had previously revealed to the Air Force. Acting upon a request by the 
Air Force, the Commissioner of Patents issued a secrecy order on the gun 
sight pursuant to provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act,1 thus preventing 
the issuance of a patent to the plaintiff. In order for the United States to 
have a second source of supply for the sights, the plaintiff revealed its engi-
neering information to another manufacturer upon governmental request 
to do so. In 1955 plaintiff brought this action in the district court to recover 
compensation for gun sights which had been produced by the second 
manufacturer and sold to the Air Force. After protracted litigation2 the 
1 35 u.s.c. §§ 181-88 (1958). 
2 The litigation in the lower courts resulted in three opinions. There was a denial of 
the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, 
133 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), a separate trial on the issue of liability, 175 F. Supp. 
230 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), and the determination of damages, from which this appeal was taken, 
197 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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plaintiff obtained a judgment in excess of 650,000 dollars against the United 
States. On appeal, held, reversed for lack of jurisdiction, one judge dissent-
ing. Since the Invention Secrecy Act is applicable only in cases involving 
unauthorized governmental use of inventions under a secrecy order, the 
proper forum for the plaintiff was the Court of Claims. Farrand Optical 
Co. v. United States, 135 U.S.P.Q. 165 (2d Cir. 1962). 
There are three provisions in the United States Code under which an 
inventor may seek compensation from the United States for governmental 
use of his invention. I£ the plaintiff-inventor already has a patent covering 
an invention which the United States uses without authorization, his action 
will be in the Court of Claims under the special patent provision in the 
judicial code.3 This section provides for suit in the Court of Claims for all 
damages resulting from the unauthorized governmental use.4 Second, the 
inventor may be allowed, in certain cases, to proceed under the statute 
which defines the general jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over claims 
against the United States founded on contract, express or implied.5 Finally, 
in cases where the invention is important to some aspect of national defense, 
there may be certain special procedures available to the plaintiff-inventor 
under the Invention Secrecy Act. 6 These remedies are available to the in-
ventor only in those cases in which the invention has been placed under a 
secrecy order at the request of a defense agency.7 Issuance of such an order 
can occur in one of two ways. Voluntary disclosure by the inventor to a 
defense agency may result in a request by that agency that a secrecy order 
be issued by the Commissioner of Patents;8 or, where the inventor applies 
for a patent prior to disclosure, the Commissioner of Patents may initiate 
steps which will result in a secrecy order. The effect of the secrecy order is 
to prevent the issuance of a patent to the inventor for a period of one year 
or longer.9 
The present Invention Secrecy Act, which is the third such statute 
enacted by Congress,10 provides two routes whereby an inventor may, at 
3 28 u.s.c. § 1498 (1958). 
4 This statute had no application in the principal case, as all use by the government 
was authorized by the plaintiff. 
5 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958). The district courts have concurrent jurisdiction of claims 
not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958). It was this provision which the court felt 
was applicable in the principal case. 
6 35 u.s.c. § 183 (1958). 
7 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1958). The act defines as defense agencies the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the Department of Defense, and any other agency so designated by the President. 
8 This procedure was followed in the principal case. 
9 An order is not ordinarily issued for more than one year. It is renewable for addi-
titional one-year terms upon notification to the Commissioner of Patents from the agency 
or department which caused its issuance. If the order issues during wartime, it remains 
in effect for the duration of hostilities plus one year. In the case of issuance during a 
national emergency declared by the President, the additional period is six months. 
10 The first such statute was passed during \'lorld ,var I. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch, 95, 
40 Stat. 394. In contrast to the present act, this statute applied only when the disclosure 
of the invention was voluntary. The only remedy provided under this act was a suit in 
the Court of Claims after the patent issued. The second statute virtually identical to 
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his option, obtain compensation from the government.11 The inventor may 
apply to the agency head issuing the secrecy order for compensation for 
any resulting damages. If a satisfactory settlement of the claim cannot be 
reached, the head of the department or agency may award to the inventor 
an amount equal to seventy-five percent of what the agency head feels to be 
a just compensation figure. The inventor may then bring suit for any addi-
tional amount he feels is due him in either the Court of Claims or the 
district court of the district in which he resides.12 In the alternative, the 
inventor may decline to negotiate with the department head, and then sue 
in the Court of Claims after the patent issues.13 
Two major interpretative questions involving the Invention Secrecy Act 
had been litigated prior to the decision in the principal case. In Robinson 
v. United States14 the Government contended that a plaintiff could not bring 
suit under the act if, upon application to a department head, his claim 
was denied in toto. The Second Circuit rejected this contention on the 
ground that such an interpretation would be wholly inconsistent with the 
policy of the statute, as it would discourage inventors from using the ad-
ministrative remedy provided by the act.15 The Second Circuit had occasion 
again to interpret the Invention Secrecy Act in Halpern v. United States,16 
wherein the Government maintained that no suit could be brought under 
the act until the secrecy order was rescinded. In reversing the lower court 
decision favoring the Government, the court of appeals met the Govern-
ment's contention tliat such suits would endanger the national security by 
stating that these suits could be tried in camera.17 By resorting to this un-
common procedure in Halpern, the Second Circuit seemed to indicate that 
it would follow a policy of liberal interpretation, favorable to plaintiff-
inventors, when dealing with Invention Secrecy Act litigation.18 
In contrast to the rather flexible attitude evidenced in the Halpern and 
Robinson decisions,10 however, the court in the principal case adopted a 
the first, was enacted just prior to entry of the United States into World War II. Act of 
July 1, 1940, ch. 501, 54 Stat. 710. 
11 For a general discussion of the history of the Invention Secrecy Act, see generally 
LeMieux, Patent Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 41 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 112 (1959). 
12 This latter procedure was followed in the principal case. 
13 This is essentially the remedy which had been available under the previous acts. 
Sec note 10 supra. 
14 236 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1956). 
15 Id. at 28. The court felt that inventors would in all cases refuse to apply to the 
head of the agency if a complete denial of their claim would defeat any chance of 
recovery. 
10 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958). 
11 Id. at 43. 
18 It is not at all clear that in camera trials arc permissible in United States courts, 
as all trials arc to be conducted "in open court." FED. R. C1v. P. 77(b). See also Note, 59 
CoLUM, L. REv. 352, 354 (1959). Despite this problem the Halpern decision received 
generally favorable comment from the writers on policy grounds. See 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 
168 (1959); 72 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1959). 
10 In Halpern the court frankly admitted that the statutory language did not require 
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highly restrictive approach to the procedural provisions of the Invention 
Secrecy Act. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the act applies 
in all cases where damages are sought for governmental use of an invention 
upon which a secrecy order had been imposed,20 and instead held that the 
act is applicable only to cases involving unauthorized governmental use 
that is prior to the issuance of the patent and which is made possible 
through disclosure of the invention under section 181 of the act. The 
court relied on three different arguments to justify its decision. The opinion 
noted that, prior to the passage of the Invention Secrecy Act, any inventor 
who had a contract with the government for the use of his invention had 
a legal remedy,21 as did the inventor who was damaged by unauthorized use 
of an already patented invention.22 From this the court concluded that the 
sole purpose of the Invention Secrecy Act was to give a remedy to the 
inventor who had no contract with the government and, in addition, was 
prevented from getting a patent by a secrecy order.23 However, it would 
seem that the act could validly be interpreted as doing more than merely 
filling this procedural gap, since it outlined a much more detailed proce-
dure for compensation in secrecy order ~ases than the single Court of 
Claims remedy provided in sections 149 ... and 1498 of Title 28. The de-
tailed provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act suggest that Congress intend-
ed all cases involving secrecy orders to be handled under this more 
comprehensive scheme. Further, the court was impressed with the language 
in the act which provides that all defenses available to the United States 
under section 1498 are available under the Invention Secrecy Act.24 Since 
an express or implied contract has been held by the Supreme Court to be 
a complete defense to a claim under section 1498,25 the court reasoned that 
the existence of a contract would be a complete defense under the Invention 
Secrecy Act. However, section 1498, unlike the Invention Secrecy Act, 
states that it is designed only for cases involving unauthorized use. It was 
because of this specific language that the Supreme Court reasoned that an 
express or implied contract was a complete defense to a section 1498 action. 
Further, the holding in the principal case creates a situation wherein the 
jurisdiction of the court, as well as application of the act, will depend upon 
the meritorious question of whether there is an express or implied contract 
the liberal interpretation given the act, but felt that the decision was nevertheless 
consistent with the congressional policy of encouraging inventors to disclose their invcn• 
tions to the United States. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 42 (2d. Cir. 1958). 
20 But see Robinson v. United States, 236 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1956): "Section 18:l 
apparently sets out a comprehensive scheme for providing compensation in all cases 
where secrecy orders are issued." (Emphasis added.) 
21 28 u.s.c. § 1491 (1958). 
22 28 u.s.c. § 1498 (1958). 
23 Principal case at 171. 
24 Ibid. The lower court took the view that this provision referred only to defenses 
going to the merits of the case, and not claims to defeat the jurisdiction of the district 
court. Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 230, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
25 DeForest Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236 (1927). 
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between the plaintiff and the government. Such a view leaves the plaintiff 
in a quandary as to which forum to choose if his case involves a close ques-
tion as to the existence of such a contract. In addition, this view forces the 
courts to pass on certain questions going to the merits before deciding the 
question of jurisdiction. Finally, the court justified its holding on the 
ground that a contrary result would mean that an inventor's right to com-
pensation under the act for defense inventions voluntarily disclosed would 
depend upon whether or not a secrecy order had issued.26 However, this 
would not seem to be a legitimate concern, as the inventor can protect 
himself from possible harm on this account by the simple expedient of 
filing for a patent at the same time he discloses the invention to the govern-
ment, thus forcing the government to protect him with either a patent or 
a secrecy order. 
Under the holding of the principal case, any inventor who voluntarily 
discloses his invention to the government, or otherwise authorizes govern-
ment use of it, is deprived of the special remedies under the Invention 
Secrecy Act. If the holding of the court is to be taken literally, it appears 
that the inventor who in any r<1y authorizes government use of his inven-
tion, in addition to being deprivtd of a local district court forum, will also 
be denied the administrative remedy provided by the act, due to the fact 
that he loses all of the special remedies provided under the act wher the 
government use is authorized.27 This will mean that his only remedy w. ll be 
the often undesirable procedure of suing in the Court of Claims on an ex-
press or implied contract.28 There can be little doubt that this development 
will, to some extent, discourage the disclosure to the government of inven-
tions with military value.29 Thus the decision seems to be contrary to the 
announced purpose of the act, which was to encourage the disclosure of 
26 Although the dissent in the principal case designated this as a mere make-weight 
argument, it appears to be a significant problem. See Gearon v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 
548, 115 F. Supp. 910 (1953), wherein the plaintiff-inventor was denied relief for un-
authorized use by the government of an unpatented pontoon bridge design which had 
not been placed under a secrecy order. 
27 If the holding of the principal decision is extended this far, it would be a great 
inconvenience to inventors. There is much to be said for the advantages of settling 
patent claims against the United States by administrative action as opposed to costly 
litigation. Sec generally Saragovitz, Administrative Claims for Patent Infringement Against 
Agencies of the United States Government, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 111 (1960). 
28 There can be no doubt that inventors who are situated far from "Washington, D.C., 
arc at a disadvantage when they must sue in the Court of Claims. Such a suit entails 
large travel expenditures and retention of ·washington counsel, as well as the loss of 
many other possible advantages of bringing suit in one's own locale. 
20 Studies of the problems of defense inventors indicate that the greatest deterrents to 
voluntary disclosure of inventions to the government are the inadequate remuneration 
given by the government and the procedural difficulties in obtaining it. See generally 
Mosel, Attitudes of American Inventors Toward Defense Invention, 2 PATENT, TRADEMARK 
&: CoP\1UGHT J. OF REsEARCH & EDUCATION 198 (Supp. 1958); Mosel, Incentives and 
Deterrents to Inventing for National Defense, 1 PATENT, TRADEMARK 8c COPYRIGHT J. OF 
REsEARCH & EDUCATION 185 (1957). 
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defense inventions.30 It is unlikely Congress intended that the inventor 
who voluntarily discloses his invention to, and authorizes its use by, the 
United States should be deprived of the benefits of a statute specifically 
designed to encourage such disclosure and authorization. There can be no 
doubt that the language of the Invention Secrecy Act does not necessitate 
the holding in the principal case. By drawing a distinction between cases 
where secrecy orders are issued, and cases where they are not, the court 
could have upheld the lower court's decision.31 The fact that the court 
rejected this perhaps more logical distinction, and instead made the appli-
cability of the Invention Secrecy Act tum on the question of whether the 
government use was authorized, gives rise to inquiry as to what other 
factors may have influenced the court's decision. 
Perhaps the majority of the court chose to follow the narrow, if legally 
defensible, view taken in order to reduce the number of cases under the 
act in which the plaintiff-inventor would have the opportunity to indulge 
in "forum-shopping." Many excellent arguments can be made against the 
practice of giving a plaintiff a choice of two federal forums in which to 
bring his suit, especially where the case law binding on one forum is not 
binding on the other.32 While this decision will effectively reduce the num-
ber of instances in which the plaintiff will have two forums available to 
him under the Invention Secrecy Act, the fact that it may lead to the depri-
vation of the administrative remedy provided by the act will serve only to 
add a greater load to already crowded court dockets.33 Thus the decision in 
the principal case may have alleviated one procedural problem, if forum-
shopping is to be considered as such, at the expense of compounding another. 
The courts should be hesitant to deny the use of a forum which Congress 
specifically chose for the purpose of lessening the burdens inherent in any 
lawsuit.34 If Congress is truly interested in encouraging the country's inven-
tors to disclose their inventions to the government, corrective legislation 
would seem to be in order as a result of this decision. Congress should 
30 See H.R. REP. No. 1028, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. REP. No. 1001, 82d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1951). See also Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1958). 
31 The dissenting judge in the principal case felt that the statute did not even "hint 
at the distinction" drawn by the court. Principal case at 173. See also note 21 supra. 
There can be no doubt that the Robinson case gave the court sufficient authority to 
draw the distinction between secrecy order and non-secrecy order cases if it so desired. 
32 This problem has received much attention in the area of tax litigation appeals. 
See, e.g., Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARv. L. 
REv. 477 (1945); Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REv. 
1153 (1944). 
33 Loss of the administrative remedy will in all probability result in an increase in 
the caseload of the district courts, as it is the case involving an amount of less than 
$10,000 which would be -most likely to be settled in the administrative process. See note 
5 supra. 
34 The amendment to the Invention Secrecy Act allowing suit in the district court 
was added by Senator Mccarren without debate. Senator Mccarren justified this change 
by saying that this amendment would allow plaintiff-inventors to sue for compensation 
without having to come to Washington to press their claims. 97 CONG. REc. 13670 (1951). 
1963] RECENT DECISIONS 145 
clearly indicate its desires as to the applicability of the statute, especially 
as to the forums available to a plaintiff under it. This must be done to 
preclude a recurrence of the result in the principal case, whereby seven 
years of litigation was wasted because of an improper choice of forum. 
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. 
